 Does the remuneration of the managers constitute a creation factor of the shareholders' richness?Hentati Fakher and Bouri Abdelfettah International Journal of Managerial and Financial Accounting, 2015, vol. 7, issue 2, 103-113 Abstract: The remuneration of the managers constitutes a current debate which relates to the governorship of firm and which fits in a prospect for alignment of the interests of the managers and shareholders. It was the subject of vast running of research mainly Anglo-Saxon and French-speaking. Many Anglo-Saxon publications tend to show the positive effect of a practice of shareholding of the managers on the richness of the shareholders. However, the French practices are radically different from the Anglo-Saxon practices. In Tunisia, few studies were carried out on this subject. It seems, thus, important to study in this paper the effects of the remuneration of the managers on the shareholders' richness of the Tunisian firms. From the econometric tests applied to Tunisian data of panel, the principal results show that remuneration by the formula of the shareholding does not necessarily constitute an effective means to force the managers to meet the interests of the shareholders. This corroborates the assumptions of the entrenchment theory. Keywords: managerial remuneration; shareholder wealth; entrenchment theory; dividend policy; corporate governance; Tunisia; econometrics. (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:injmfa:v:7:y:2015:i:2:p:103-113 Access Statistics for this article More articles in International Journal of Managerial and Financial Accounting from Inderscience Enterprises Ltd |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.