Implementing the Mas-Colell bargaining set

Roberto Serrano and Rajiv Vohra

Investigaciones Economicas, 2002, vol. 26, issue 2, 285-298

Abstract: We provide a mechanism that approximately implements the Mas-Colell bargaining set in subgame perfect equilibrium. The mechanism is based on the definition of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, and respects feasibility in and out of equilibrium. (Copyright: Fundación Empresa Pública)

Keywords: Mas-Colell bargaining set; implementation; approximate implementation; subgame perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 C78 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Implementing the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set (2001)
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