Papel de la política de dividendos en las empresas reguladas

Belén Lozano, Alberto de Miguel () and Julio Pindado
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Belén Lozano: Universidad de Salamanca, https://www.usal.es
Alberto de Miguel: Universidad de Salamanca, https://www.usal.es

Investigaciones Economicas, 2002, vol. 26, issue 3, 447-474

Abstract: In this paper we develop a model to explain the dividend policy of firms under regulation in order to analyse the role of dividends in regulated firms. Before estimating the model using the Generalised Method of Moments, we solved the censoring problem of the dependent variable. The empirical evidence confirms that dividend policy is a mechanism for lessening the conflict between the shareholders and the regulator. Furthermore, this policy is an effective mechanism for aligning managers’ interests with those of shareholders in the scenario of regulated firms. In fact, it is more eficient than the ones previously described in the literature, excepting debt.

Keywords: Regulation; dividend policy; agency conflicts. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G35 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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