La configuración de una tasa judicial: análisis teórico

Alejandro Esteller-Moré ()

Investigaciones Economicas, 2002, vol. 26, issue 3, 525-549

Abstract: This paper analyses the optimal design of a user charge on filing suit, which aims at maximising social welfare. Thus, this instrument must be useful to internalise the social costs and benefits by the litigants, in such a way that if social costs are lower than social benefits the user charge will become a subsidy. Moreover, the user charge can increase private welfare for those with a high probability of prevailing. Finally, from the results obtained in the theoretical analysis, we perform an exercise of comparative static by means of a numerical simulation.

Keywords: Litigation process; congestion costs; filing costs; numerical simulations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H2 H21 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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