Unilateral commitments to disclose know-how in research joint ventures

Joel Sandonis

Investigaciones Economicas, 2003, vol. 27, issue 1, 173-196

Abstract: In this paper, the use of unilateral commitments by the partners participating in a Research Joint Venture (RJV) is explained as part of the firms’ attempt to select the efficient equilibrium in cases where multiple equilibria exist. In a framework including asymmetric information and uncertainty we show that unilateral commitment by a firm to disclose its own know-how to the venture can be effective in inducing cooperative behavior by the partners only if they have complementary technologies, their absorptive capacity is not very high and only for intermediate innovation values. Complementarity between the partners also increases stability in RJVs.

Keywords: Research joint ventures; unilateral commitments; mral hazard; know-how (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O31 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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