Domestic Industrial Structure and Export Quality

Shih-Chen Chiang and Robert T Masson

International Economic Review, 1988, vol. 29, issue 2, 261-70

Abstract: Country of origin may provide a signal of product quality. If consumers are on average "correct" in thei r assessments of product quality from a given country, then a "lemons " effect emerges. A firm which pays the full cost of quality improvem ent will receive only diluted benefits in return, while competitors gain by free-riding. The resulting international trade equilibrium i s suboptimal for the exporting country. The country may be able to ra ise its welfare by use of export quality standards, or by internalizi ng the externality by limiting export licenses or by industrial conso lidation. Copyright 1988 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Date: 1988
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