Regulating without Cost Information: The Incremental Surplus Subsidy Scheme

David Sappington and David S Sibley

International Economic Review, 1988, vol. 29, issue 2, 297-306

Abstract: The authors propose a regulatory mechanism, called the incremental surplus subsidy (ISS) scheme, that can be implemented even when the regulato r has no knowledge of the monopolist's cost structure. The regulator need only share the firm's knowledge of demand (which may be imperfec t) and be able to observe (with a lag) the firm's expenditures. The I SS scheme induces the firm to set marginal cost prices, to minimize p roduction costs, and to undertake efficient investment levels. It als o severely limits the firm's rents, and eliminates them altogether if the firm's discount rate is known. Copyright 1988 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Date: 1988
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