Informative Advertising and Competition: A Noncooperative Approach

Robert Gary-Bobo () and Philippe Michel

International Economic Review, 1991, vol. 32, issue 2, 321-39

Abstract: The properties of informative advertising are studied in the context of an imperfectly competitive general equilibrium model of the Cournot-Walras type. Competitive conditions are recreated using the "replication technique." It is shown that individually optimal advertising expenditures are zero if the number of agents is large enough in the economy. In other words, even in approximately competitive economies, the informative advertising phenomenon cannot be observed. Copyright 1991 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Date: 1991
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Working Paper: Informative advertising and competition: a noncooperative approach (1991)
Working Paper: Informative advertising and competition: a non-cooperative approach (1988)
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