Efficiency and Mechanisms with No Regret

Bhaskar Chakravorti

International Economic Review, 1992, vol. 33, issue 1, 45-59

Abstract: Can the author always design a game form so that all its Bayesian equilibrium outcomes are either interim individually rational efficient or interim envy-free efficient in asymmetric information economies? The author shows that the answer is no. Given that such games exist in complete information economies, can this gap be filled by games that leak information endogenously without enlarging the equilibrium set? The author adopts two approaches. First, he introduces a theory of "cheap play" as a natural model of such games. The second is an extreme approach that adopts an ex post viewpoint. Neither yields a possibility result. Copyright 1992 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Date: 1992
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