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Continuous Time Repeated Games

James Bergin and W. Bentley Macleod ()

International Economic Review, 1993, vol. 34, issue 1, 21-37

Abstract: In this paper, the authors develop a model of strategic behavior in continuous time games of complete information, which includes conventional repeated games in discrete time as a special case. The model developed here admits a very large class of strategies that allows one to extend the repeated game model to continuous time. The set of equilibria in this game may be large--in many cases equal to the feasible individually rational set of payoff s. The authors also study the restriction of renegotiation proofness in this framework and apply these results to a Cournot duopoly example. Copyright 1993 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Date: 1993
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