Shared Facility Games with Variable Utilization

Van Kolpin

International Economic Review, 1993, vol. 34, issue 2, 387-400

Abstract: Shared facility games are environments involving shared use of productive facilities by economic agents. The author introduces the concept of generalized pricing equilibria that exhibit such features as volume discounts, bundling, and personalized pricing. Generalized pricing equilibria are found to induce core allocations and be characterizable in terms of the maximal surplus attainable by the grand coalition. Shared facility games are revealed to exist for which none of its core allocations are induced by generalized pricing equilibria, despite their generality. The author's analysis encompasses arbitrary benefits/costs, multiservice facilities, public goods, nontransferable utility, and private ownership of facilities. Copyright 1993 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Date: 1993
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