A Note on the Nonexistence of a Rationing Equilibrium in the Besanko-Thakor Model

Gerhard Clemenz

International Economic Review, 1993, vol. 34, issue 3, 727-37

Abstract: It is shown that in a credit market with two types of borrowers, distinguished only through their not commonly known probability of default, and with a perfectly elastic supply of deposits, a pair of contracts with random rationing of less risky loan applicants cannot be a Nash-equilibrium. Copyright 1993 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Date: 1993
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-6598%2819930 ... O%3B2-M&origin=repec full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:34:y:1993:i:3:p:727-37

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0020-6598

Access Statistics for this article

International Economic Review is currently edited by Harold L. Cole

More articles in International Economic Review from Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing () and ().