Procurement Policy and Contracting Efficiency

Anthony G Bower

International Economic Review, 1993, vol. 34, issue 4, 873-901

Abstract: The contracting literature has emphasized the optimality of using certain contracting instruments, such as multiple cost observations, full commitment, self-selection, and competition. A two-period procurement model is constructed incorporating all of the instruments and optimal contracts are characterized. Numerical examples suggest that the marginal benefits of full commitment, self-selection, and multiple cost observations are small, while the benefits of competition are larger. To obtain some evidence on contracting costs, defense contracting is reviewed. It indicates that using these instruments is very costly, thus calling into question the optimality of using all of the procurement instruments. Copyright 1993 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Date: 1993
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