Firm-Specific Human Capital and Optimal Capital Structure

Priscilla Butt Jaggia and Anjan Thakor ()

International Economic Review, 1994, vol. 35, issue 2, 283-308

Abstract: The authors consider the moral hazard in managers undersupplying imperfectly-marketable, firm-specific human capital. Firms may cope by granting long-term wage contracts that protect managers against employment termination. Although ex ante efficient, these contracts may be ex post inefficient when managerial ability is discovered to be low. Precommitted firms must honor these contracts, unless there is ownership transfer that permits their legal invalidation. Bankruptcy is one such transfer mechanism. Since managers anticipate the contractual consequence of bankruptcy, leverage worsens moral hazard; this cost provides a counterbalance to the debt tax shield and leads to an optimal capital structure. Copyright 1994 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Date: 1994
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