Optimal Pricing Strategy in Marketing Research Consulting

Chun-Hao Chang and Chi-Wen Jevons Lee

International Economic Review, 1994, vol. 35, issue 2, 463-78

Abstract: This paper studies the optimal pricing scheme for a monopolistic marketing research consultant who sells high-cost proprietary marketing information to her oligopolistic clients in the manufacturing industry. In designing an optimal pricing strategy, the consultant needs to fully consider the behavior of her clients, the behavior of the existing and potential competitors to her clients, and the behavior of her clients' customers. The authors show how the environment uncertainty, the capability of clients' internal research department, and the number of potential clients can affect the optimal pricing scheme. Copyright 1994 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Date: 1994
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