Economics at your fingertips  

Gender Bias, Investments in Children, and Bequests

James Davies () and Junsen Zhang

International Economic Review, 1995, vol. 36, issue 3, 795-818

Abstract: The impacts of pure sex preference and differential earnings opportunities by gender on investments in children are modelled with altruism. If bequest constraints do not bind human investments are privately efficient, with the higher-earning gender receiving more education. Education does not depend on parental wealth. The gender differential in bequests is ambiguous, however, even in this case. When bequest constraints bind education may depend on wealth and it is also possible for the gender with better earnings opportunities to get less education. The model is tested with data from Philippine villages where bequest constraints are generally nonbinding. The schooling differential slightly favors daughters. Estimated bequest behavior, however, reflects pure sex preference in terms of our model. Copyright 1995 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Date: 1995
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) ... 0.CO%3B2-6&origin=bc full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0020-6598

Access Statistics for this article

International Economic Review is currently edited by Harold L. Cole

More articles in International Economic Review from Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing ().

Page updated 2019-06-17
Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:36:y:1995:i:3:p:795-818