 Toward Natural ImplementationTatsuyoshi Saijo (), Yoshikatsu Tatamitani and Takehiko Yamato International Economic Review, 1996, vol. 37, issue 4, 949-80 Abstract: The authors identify some fundamental conditions that a 'natural' mechanism should satisfy in exchange economies. First, they provide necessary and sufficient conditions for social choice correspondences to be implemented in Nash equilibria by natural mechanisms. Second, they show that the class of social choice correspondences implementable by (price and) two-quantity mechanisms is equivalent to the class of social choice correspondences implementable by (price and) allocation mechanisms. Third, the authors find that the no-envy correspondence is implementable by a two-quantity mechanism and the fair correspondence is implementable by a price-quantity mechanism. Copyright 1996 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association. Date: 1996 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:37:y:1996:i:4:p:949-80 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article International Economic Review is currently edited by Harold L. Cole More articles in International Economic Review from Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297. Contact information at EDIRC. |
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