Strategic Trade Policy under Uncertainty: Sufficient Conditions for the Optimality of Ad Valorem, Specific and Quadratic Trade Taxes

Simon Grant and John Quiggin

International Economic Review, 1997, vol. 38, issue 1, 187-203

Abstract: In most previous work on strategic trade policy, the form of government intervention has been prescribed in advance. In this paper, the authors apply a solution concept discussed by P. D. Klemperer and M. A. Meyer (1989) for games in which the strategy space consists of the class of all (non-state-contingent) price quantity schedules. They examine a series of specific assumptions on demand and supply conditions and derive the associated equilibrium trade policies. The authors derive welfare implications for all cases examined. Copyright 1997 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:38:y:1997:i:1:p:187-203

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0020-6598

Access Statistics for this article

International Economic Review is currently edited by Harold L. Cole

More articles in International Economic Review from Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing () and ().