Marketplaces and Matching
Melvyn Coles and
Eric Smith ()
International Economic Review, 1998, vol. 39, issue 1, 239-54
This paper models trading patterns when marketplaces exist and goods are differentiated. When first visiting the market, a buyer samples a stock of goods. If fortunate, the buyer finds a match, purchases one of these goods, and then exits. If not, the buyer can now only match with the flow of new goods. In a steady state, the stock of unmatched traders on one side of the market is trying to match with the flow of new traders on the other side. This behavior is shown to describe matching patterns between unemployed job seekers and vacancies in U.K. job centers. Copyright 1998 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Working Paper: Marketplaces and Matching (1994)
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