Cost-Reducing Investment, Competition, and Industry Dynamics

Emmanuel Petrakis and Santanu Roy

International Economic Review, 1999, vol. 40, issue 2, 381-401

Abstract: We demonstrate the possibility of shake-out of firms and emergence of interfirm heterogeneity along the (socially optimal) dynamic equilibrium path of a competitive industry with free entry and exit, even when there is no uncertainty and all firms are ex ante identical with perfect foresight. Atomistic firms with upward-sloping marginal cost curves undertake investment in firm-specific cost reduction. They earn negative net profits in early periods, compensated later by strictly positive net profits; no entry occurs after the initial time period. Some firms may exit before others even while other firms earn positive net profits. Copyright 1999 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Date: 1999
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Working Paper: Cost Reducing Investment, Competition and Industry Dynamics (1998)
Working Paper: Cost reducing investiment, competition and industry dynamics (1996)
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