An Empirical Equilibrium Job Search Model with Search on the Job and Heterogeneous Workers and Firms
Christian Bontemps,
Jean-Marc Robin and
Gerard van den Berg
International Economic Review, 1999, vol. 40, issue 4, 1039-74
Abstract:
In this article we present and estimate a synthesis of previous equilibrium search models, allowing for continuous distributions of workers' opportunity costs of employment as well as firms' productivities. The model allows for on-the-job search, and we assume that job offer arrival rates for workers are independent of their labor-market state. We derive the theoretical implications of these assumptions, we provide simulations, and we develop a semiparametric estimation procedure that we apply to a dataset of individual labor-market histories. Copyright 1999 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:40:y:1999:i:4:p:1039-74
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