Unique Implementation of Action Profiles: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

Sandro Brusco

International Economic Review, 2002, vol. 43, issue 2, 509-532

Abstract: I study the general problem of a principal who desires to implement a given vector of actions and pay the agents according to a given compensation scheme. Previous work has provided mechanisms for implementation in various special cases. In this article, I fully characterize the set of action profiles and compensation schemes implementable in subgame-perfect equilibrium, providing necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation. Copyright Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association

Date: 2002
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Working Paper: Unique implementation of action profiles: necessary and sufficient conditions (1997)
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