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A Queuing Model of the Market for Access to Trading Partners

Michael Sattinger

International Economic Review, 2002, vol. 43, issue 2, 533-548

Abstract: In this article, a market for access to trading partners arises through the operation of a competitive market in which consumers queue for goods at firms. Equilibrium occurs when firms and buyers face the same trade-off between price and wait time. The trade-off measures the cost to firms of more customers and the cost to customers of a shorter expected wait time. The queuing model is related to mechanisms that ration goods among potential buyers and to models in which the good is characterized by price and by a second variable reflecting likelihood of or delay in transaction. Copyright Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association

Date: 2002
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