Centralization, Fiscal Federalism, and Private School Attendance

Thomas Nechyba ()

International Economic Review, 2003, vol. 44, issue 1, 179-204

Abstract: A CGE model is used to analyze the impact of public school financing on private school attendance. The common perception that public school finance centralization will necessarily lead to greater private school attendance is not correct in such a model--even when that centralization involves an extreme equalization as in California. Furthermore, if centralization is less dramatic (as in most states), declines in private school attendance are even more pronounced. This weakens the speculation that low exit rates to private schools in centralizing states imply that general public school quality does not drop as a result of such centralization. Copyright 2003 By The Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association

Date: 2003
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Working Paper: Centralization, Fiscal Federalism and Privte School Attendance (2002)
Working Paper: Centralization, Fiscal Federalism and Private School Attendance (2001)
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