 Should Transfers To Poor Families Be Conditional On School Attendance? A Household Bargaining PerspectiveCesar Martinelli and Susan Parker (swparker@umd.edu) International Economic Review, 2003, vol. 44, issue 2, 523-544 Abstract: This article considers the welfare implications of transfers to poor families that are conditional on school attendance and other forms of investment in children's human capital. Family decisions are assumed to be the result of (generalized) Nash bargaining between the two parents. We show that, as long as bequests are zero, conditional transfers are better for children than unconditional transfers. The mother's welfare may also be improved by conditional transfers. Thus, conditioning transfers to bequest-constrained families have potentially desirable intergenerational "and" intragenerational welfare effects. Conditioning transfers to unconstrained families make every family member worse off. Copyright 2003 By The Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association. Date: 2003 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:44:y:2003:i:2:p:523-544 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article International Economic Review is currently edited by Harold L. Cole More articles in International Economic Review from Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297. Contact information at EDIRC. |
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