Endogenous business cycles and systematic stabilization policy

Marta Aloi, Teresa Lloyd-Braga and Hans Jørgen Whitta-Jacobsen

International Economic Review, 2003, vol. 44, issue 3, 895-915

Abstract: We study the effects of fiscal policy rules on the determinacy of rational expectations equilibrium in a perfectly competitive monetary model with constant returns. Government spending implies a distortion of the monetary steady state due to the implied taxation. We show that policy rules that let the GNP share of government spending depend sufficiently negatively on increases in GNP stabilize the economy with respect to endogenous fluctuations for arbitrarily little distortion of the steady state at which stabilization occurs. The rules do not involve lump-sum taxation, negative income taxation, or exact knowledge of the economy's laissez-faire steady state. Copyright 2003 By The Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.

Date: 2003
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Working Paper: Endogenous Business Cycles and Systematic Stabilization Policy (2002)
Working Paper: Endogenous Business Cycles and Systematic Stabilization Policy (2002)
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