EMPLOYMENT, DETERRENCE, AND CRIME IN A DYNAMIC MODEL

Susumu Imai and Kala Krishna ()

International Economic Review, 2004, vol. 45, issue 3, 845-872

Abstract: Using maximum likelihood techniques and monthly panel data we solve and estimate an explicitly dynamic model of criminal behavior where current criminal activity impacts future labor market outcomes. We show that the threat of future adverse effects in the labor market when arrested acts as a strong deterrent to crime. Moreover, such forward-looking behavior is estimated to be important. Hence, policies that weaken this deterrence will be much less effective in fighting crime. This suggests that prevention is more powerful than redemption since anticipated redemption allows criminals to look forward to negating the consequences of their crimes. Copyright 2004 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.

Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:45:y:2004:i:3:p:845-872

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0020-6598

Access Statistics for this article

International Economic Review is currently edited by Harold L. Cole

More articles in International Economic Review from Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing () and ().