EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

SOCIAL NETWORKS AND CRIME DECISIONS: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN FACILITATING DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR

Antoni Calvó-Armengol and Yves Zenou ()

International Economic Review, 2004, vol. 45, issue 3, 939-958

Abstract: Delinquents compete with each other in criminal activities but benefit from being friends with other criminals by learning and acquiring proper know-how on the crime business. We study the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of this game in which individuals decide first to work or to become a criminal and then the crime effort provided if criminals. We show that multiple equilibria with different numbers of active criminals and levels of involvement in crime activities may coexist and are only driven by the geometry of the pattern of links connecting criminals. Copyright 2004 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.

Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (104) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent ... &year=2004&part=null link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Social Networks and Crime Decisions: The Role of Social Structure in Facilitating Delinquent Behavior (2003) Downloads
Working Paper: Social Networks and Crime Decisions: The Role of Social Structure in Facilitating Delinquent Behaviour (2003) Downloads
Working Paper: Social Networks and Crime Decisions: The Role of Social Structure in Facilitating Delinquent Behavior (2003) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:45:y:2004:i:3:p:939-958

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0020-6598

Access Statistics for this article

International Economic Review is currently edited by Harold L. Cole

More articles in International Economic Review from Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing ().

 
Page updated 2020-02-23
Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:45:y:2004:i:3:p:939-958