OPTIMAL CARTEL PRICING IN THE PRESENCE OF AN ANTITRUST AUTHORITY

Joseph Harrington ()

International Economic Review, 2005, vol. 46, issue 1, 145-169

Abstract: The dynamic behavior of a price-fixing cartel is explored when it is concerned about creating suspicions that a cartel has formed. Consistent with preceding static theories, the cartel's steady-state price is decreasing in the damage multiple and the probability of detection. However, contrary to those theories, it is independent of the level of fixed fines. It is also shown that the cartel prices higher when a more competitive benchmark price is used in calculating damages. Copyright 2005 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.

Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (93)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:46:y:2005:i:1:p:145-169

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0020-6598

Access Statistics for this article

International Economic Review is currently edited by Harold L. Cole

More articles in International Economic Review from Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing () and ().