INFLATION, OUTPUT, AND WELFARE
Ricardo Lagos and
Guillaume Rocheteau
International Economic Review, 2005, vol. 46, issue 2, 495-522
Abstract:
We study the effects of anticipated inflation on aggregate output and welfare within a search-theoretic framework. We consider two pricing mechanisms: ex post bargaining and a notion of competitive pricing. Under bargaining, the equilibrium is generically inefficient and an increase in inflation reduces buyers' search intensities, output, and welfare. If prices are posted and buyers can direct their search, search intensities are increasing with inflation for low inflation rates and decreasing for high inflation rates. The Friedman rule achieves the efficient allocation, and inflation always reduces welfare, although it can have a positive effect on output for low inflation rates. Copyright 2005 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.
Date: 2005
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Working Paper: Inflation, output, and welfare (2004) 
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