EQUILIBRIUM AND THE CORE IN ALONSO'S DISCRETE POPULATION MODEL OF LAND USE
Marcus Berliant () and
Thijs ten Raa ()
International Economic Review, 2007, vol. 48, issue 1, 235-246
Conventional wisdom tells us that with no market failure and local nonsatiation of preferences, the core is at least as large as the collection of competitive equilibrium allocations. We confirm this for a standard model featuring private ownership of land. Next we consider the public land ownership version of the model. If the role of land ownership and rent distribution is assumed by a government that ploughs back rent (at least in excess of its agricultural value) to its citizens, the equilibrium allocation remains efficient, but no longer need be in the core. Copyright 2007 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.
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Working Paper: Equilibrium and the Core in Alonso's Discrete Population Model of Land Use (2005)
Working Paper: Equilibrium and the Core in Alonso's Discrete Population Model of Land Use (2004)
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