QUANTIFYING THE LAFFER CURVE ON THE CONTINUED ACTIVITY TAX IN A DYNASTIC FRAMEWORK

Jean-Olivier Hairault, Francois Langot and Thepthida Sopraseuth

International Economic Review, 2008, vol. 49, issue 3, 755-797

Abstract: It is argued that the tax on continued activity should be removed by implementing actuarially fair schemes. However, these schemes cannot fund the expected Social Security (SS) deficit. This article proposes to give individuals a "fraction" of the actuarially fair incentives in the case of postponed retirement. SS faces a trade-off between giving enough incentives to make individuals delay retirement and giving little increase in pensions in order to help finance its expected deficit. This trade-off is captured by a Laffer curve. Finally, when the SS system aims to maximize welfare, the optimal tax on postponed retirement is still strictly positive. Copyright © 2008 the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Date: 2008
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Related works:
Working Paper: Quantifying the Laffer Curve on the Continued Activity Tax in a Dynastic Framework (2008)
Working Paper: Quantifying the Laffer Curve on the Continued Activity Tax in a Dynastic Framework (2008)
Working Paper: Quantifying the Laffer Curve on the Continued Activity Tax in a Dynastic Framework (2008)
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