A THEORY OF WAGES AND LABOR DEMAND WITH INTRA-FIRM BARGAINING AND MATCHING FRICTIONS

Pierre Cahuc, Francois Marque and Etienne Wasmer

International Economic Review, 2008, vol. 49, issue 3, 943-972

Abstract: This article provides a model of labor market equilibrium with search and within-firm strategic bargaining. We yield explicit closed form solutions with heterogeneous labor inputs and capital. The solution exhibits overemployment. We show that higher relative bargaining power for some groups of workers may lead to overemployment relative to other groups, with such other groups being underemployed instead if they have a lower relative bargaining power. Similarly, the hold-up problem between capitalists and employees does not necessarily lead to underinvestment in physical capital. Copyright © 2008 the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Date: 2008
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Working Paper: A theory of wages and labor demand with intra-firm bargaining and matching frictions (2008)
Working Paper: A theory of wages and labor demand with intra-firm bargaining and matching frictions (2008)
Working Paper: A Theory of Wages and Labour Demand with Intra-firm Bargaining and Matching Frictions (2004)
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