FORMAL HOME HEALTH CARE, INFORMAL CARE, AND FAMILY DECISION MAKING
Michelle S. Goeree,
Bridget Hiedemann and
Steven Stern ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Michelle Sovinsky
International Economic Review, 2009, vol. 50, issue 4, 1205-1242
We use the 1993 wave of the Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) data set to estimate a game-theoretic model of families' decisions concerning the provision of informal and formal care for elderly individuals. The outcome is the Nash equilibrium where each family member jointly determines her consumption, transfers for formal care, and allocation of time to informal care, market work, and leisure. We use the estimates to decompose the effects of adult children's opportunity costs, quality of care, and caregiving burden on their propensities to provide informal care. We also simulate the effects of a broad range of policies of current interest. Copyright © (2009) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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