Electoral Competition as a Determinant of Fiscal Decentralisation

Mario Jametti () and Marcelin Joanis

Fiscal Studies, 2016, vol. 37, 285-300

Date: 2016
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Working Paper: Electoral Competition as a Determinant of Fiscal Decentralization (2011)
Working Paper: Electoral Competition as a Determinant of Fiscal Decentralization (2011)
Working Paper: Electoral Competition as a Determinant of Fiscal Decentralization (2011)
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