Anti-Takeover Cocktails: Shareholder Rights Plans, Golden Parachutes, and Shark Repellents

Calin Valsan
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Calin Valsan: Bishop’s University, Canada

International Journal of Applied Behavioral Economics (IJABE), 2012, vol. 1, issue 2, 16-25

Abstract: This paper discusses and illustrates the use of three corporate charter provisions with the help of several high profile cases. The Shareholder Rights Plan, golden parachutes, and shark repellents are takeover defence mechanisms used by incumbent managers and boards to fend off hostile bids. Here it is argued that the effectiveness of these measures is greatly increased when used in combination, producing a very potent mix of takeover deterrents.

Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:igg:jabe00:v:1:y:2012:i:2:p:16-25

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