Proof for Evolution and Coming Out of Prison with Relational Dynamics

David S. Bathory
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David S. Bathory: Psychology Department, Bathory International, LLC., Somerville, NJ, USA

International Journal of Applied Behavioral Economics (IJABE), 2015, vol. 4, issue 1, 58-69

Abstract: Within theories of mathematical prediction, decision and behavior such as game theory, there is the assumption that the players wish to win. The prisoner's dilemma points to the virtues of defection, or immediate self-preservation. Within the theory of evolutionary biology (Wilson & Wilson, 2007), motives are described from both the benefit of an individual and that of a larger group or collective, such as a colony, herd, pack or pod. Darwin described competition with his theory of survival of the fittest (Darwin, 1859 (reprinted 1982)); the theory of the selfish gene provides the motive of ensuring the transmission of similar genetics onto the next generation. (Dawkins, 1989) Nowak and Coakley (2013) explore the advantages of cooperation within evolution. Within psychological theory there is a preponderance of theory and clinical evidence that outlines other motivations such as Freud's death wish; sociopathic behaviors; philanthropists and altruism; racial/ethnic hatred, bullying and retaliation. Examples of strategies found in nature, the strategies for mutual benefit, best for me, best for you, and the best for neither are explored. A proof for evolution is provided outlining the rationale for cooperation. Cooperation; the sole outcome where there is long term gain and benefit for all versus other strategies such as competition and selfishness found in living organisms that ultimately results in extinction.

Date: 2015
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