Loss Aversion on the Links: Penalized Pro Golfers Fall Prey to Decision Bias

Todd A. McFall
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Todd A. McFall: Department of Economics, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC, USA

International Journal of Applied Behavioral Economics (IJABE), 2016, vol. 5, issue 4, 24-40

Abstract: Prospect theory predicts that loss averse agents who fear they will not reach their reference utility level are more apt to adopt risky strategies to avoid that painful possibility compared to agents who are more sure of their relative standing. This paper tests this theory with data from professional golf events and finds evidence of economically inefficient loss aversion amongst tournament competitors. While playing par five holes, golfers who have been penalized because of a poor first shot are more likely to adopt an aggressive strategy for finishing the hole compared to their non-penalized rivals who are not feeling the burden of not meeting a preconceived reference score. The risks the penalized golfers take are economically inefficient, as their average performances are worse than their non-penalized rivals' average performances for the balance of the hole.

Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:igg:jabe00:v:5:y:2016:i:4:p:24-40

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