The Effect of Agency Problem and Internal Control on Credit Risk at Commercial Banks in Vietnam
Quoc Trung Nguyen Kim
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Quoc Trung Nguyen Kim: University of Finance - Marketing, Vietnam
International Journal of Asian Business and Information Management (IJABIM), 2022, vol. 13, issue 1, 1-22
This study examines the effect of agency problem and internal control on credit risk under corporate governance theory at Vietnamese joint-stock commercial banks. Using the quantitative methods, including pooled Ordinary Least Squares, Fixed Effect Model, and Random Effect Model, this paper shows that the agency problem is a statistically significant variable. That means it is considered the most practical mechanism in corporate governance for controlling credit risk. Besides, the findings also highlight the importance of internal control components to monitor and mitigate credit risk.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:igg:jabim0:v:13:y:2022:i:1:p:1-22
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