Decisions of Green Supply Chain under Fairness Concerns and Different Power Structures

Guangdong Liu, Tianjian Yang, Yao Wei and Xuemei Zhang
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Guangdong Liu: Fuyang Normal University, Fuyang, China; Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, China
Tianjian Yang: Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, China
Yao Wei: Fuyang Normal University, Fuyang, China
Xuemei Zhang: Fuyang Normal University, Fuyang, China

International Journal of Enterprise Information Systems (IJEIS), 2018, vol. 14, issue 4, 28-53

Abstract: This article constructs a two-stage dynamic game model for green manufacturers, retailers, and consumers to address the issue that fairness preference in manufacturing can impact supply chain decision-making. This is done by discussing decision-making under the three power structures of green-manufacturer-dominated, retailer-dominated, and the Nash-equilibrium, and compares the balanced decision under the three power structures. The results show that in the manufacturer-dominated and Nash equilibrium games, product greenness, retailer profits, manufacturer profits, total supply chain profits, and a manufacturer's utility all decrease as the fairness preference increases, whereas the retail price and wholesale price are just the opposite of each other. In the retailer-dominated game, the retail price, product greenness, and total supply chain profits are not impacted by the fairness preference. The wholesale price, manufacturer's profits, and manufacturer's utility increases as the fairness preference increases, whereas the retailer profits decrease.

Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:igg:jeis00:v:14:y:2018:i:4:p:28-53

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