Evaluating Manufacturer's Wholesale Price Policy Under Order Postponement With Buyback Option
Sourabh Bhattacharya and
Shantanu Shankar Bagchi
Additional contact information
Sourabh Bhattacharya: Institute of Management Technology, Hyderabad, India
Shantanu Shankar Bagchi: Institute of Management Technology, Hyderabad, India
International Journal of Strategic Decision Sciences (IJSDS), 2019, vol. 10, issue 2, 49-69
Abstract:
In this article, a decentralized newsvendor model is analyzed in the presence of demand uncertainty, where the retailer wishes to postpone his ordering decision by few days until the most accurate demand information is available. The impact of such order postponement on the equilibrium profits of both manufacturer and retailer with and without a buyback contract is subsequently examined to obtain a range of wholesale prices within which the marginal profits for both manufacturer and retailer which are non-negative. Furthermore, it is observed that the possibility of implementing order postponement is higher when it is done in the presence of a buyback contract as it increases the marginal profits for both manufacturer and the retailer and expands the feasible region of wholesale price, which leads to a provision of higher flexibility for negotiation between the manufacturer and the retailer.
Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://services.igi-global.com/resolvedoi/resolve. ... 018/IJSDS.2019040103 (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:igg:jsds00:v:10:y:2019:i:2:p:49-69
Access Statistics for this article
International Journal of Strategic Decision Sciences (IJSDS) is currently edited by Saeed Tabar
More articles in International Journal of Strategic Decision Sciences (IJSDS) from IGI Global
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journal Editor ().