Technical Note: Vertical Rail Mergers

Michael Braulke and Jörg Schimmelpfennig
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Michael Braulke: Universität Osnabrück, Germany
Jörg Schimmelpfennig: Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany

International Journal of Strategic Decision Sciences (IJSDS), 2010, vol. 1, issue 4, 88-92

Abstract: The vertical merger of railroads involves the integration of several suppliers offering perfectly complementary services into one single market for a service bundle. In this paper, the authors analyse the welfare consequences of such a merger and present a simple Pareto-superior regulation policy. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the economics of a merger of two vertical rail monopolies.

Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:igg:jsds00:v:1:y:2010:i:4:p:88-92

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