Collective Strategies With a Master-Slave Mechanism Dominate in Spatial-Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Jiawei Li, Robert Duncan, Jingpeng Li and Ruibin Bai
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Jiawei Li: University of Nottingham, Ningbo, China
Robert Duncan: University of Stirling, UK
Jingpeng Li: University of Stirling, UK
Ruibin Bai: University of Nottingham, Ningbo, China

International Journal of Swarm Intelligence Research (IJSIR), 2021, vol. 12, issue 4, 45-56

Abstract: How cooperation emerges and persists in a population of selfish agents is a fundamental question in evolutionary game theory. The research shows that collective strategies with master-slave mechanism (CSMSM) defeat tit-for-tat and other well-known strategies in spatial iterated prisoner's dilemma. A CSMSM identifies kin members by means of a handshaking mechanism. If the opponent is identified as non-kin, a CSMSM will always defect. Once two CSMSMs meet, they play master and slave roles. A mater defects and a slave cooperates in order to maximize the master's payoff. CSMSM outperforms non-collective strategies in spatial IPD even if there is only a small cluster of CSMSMs in the population. The existence and performance of CSMSM in spatial iterated prisoner's dilemma suggests that cooperation first appears and persists in a group of collective agents.

Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:igg:jsir00:v:12:y:2021:i:4:p:45-56

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