Hold-Out After the CJEU Huawei Decision

Marie Barani
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Marie Barani: Pantheon-Assas University, London, UK

International Journal of Standardization Research (IJSR), 2017, vol. 15, issue 2, 57-75

Abstract: This article describes how the Court of Justice of the European Union, with its Huawei v ZTE ruling in July 2015, has attempted to prevent abuses from SEP-holders (hold-ups) and implementers (hold-outs) by balancing the interests of both sides. This decision establishes a contractual negotiation framework both parties must comply with. However, it leaves some questions open. This article makes a review of hold-out risks under the Samsung and Motorola decisions from the European Commission and hold-out remedies under the Huawei decision and how national courts in Europe have applied it. It also examines potential improvements of competition law and the application of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to deal with a holding-out company in Europe.

Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:igg:jsr000:v:15:y:2017:i:2:p:57-75

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