 Tax evading incentives and compromisingAhmet Erol and
Alper Demi̇r
Iktisat Isletme ve Finans, 2008, vol. 23, issue 267, 61-69 Abstract: Taxation decreases taxpayers’ disposable income and wealth. For this reason, taxpayers choose to evade tax to compensate this decrease. In modern tax systems that rely on declaration of taxpayers, tax auditing, punishment implementations and suchlike tools are used to provide taxpayers to declare their true income. The high levels of the rate of tax auditing and punishments make taxpayers to declare their income correctly. But in some situations, implementations in taxation system can cause taxpayers to hide their true income. In this paper, effects of “compromising” in Turkish taxation system on tax evading incentives is investigated by a static game theory model. With the assumption of tax authority being aimed at carrying out equitable tax burden and minimizing tax evading levels, the existence of the compromising institute will increase the cost of achieving these goals, or the propensity of tax evasion incentives will increase when the sources are constant. Keywords: tax evading; compromising; optimal auditing (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iif:iifjrn:v:23:y:2008:i:267:p:61-69 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Iktisat Isletme ve Finans is currently edited by Ali Bilge More articles in Iktisat Isletme ve Finans from Bilgesel Yayincilik |
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