Supply Chain Quality, Mandatory Insurance, and Recall Risk

Luciana Echazu and Mark Frascatore
Additional contact information
Luciana Echazu: Faculty of Economics and Financial Studies, Clarkson University, U.S.A.
Mark Frascatore: Faculty of Economics and Financial Studies, Clarkson University, U.S.A.

International Journal of Business and Economics, 2012, vol. 11, issue 1, 1-11

Abstract: If a supplier shirks on quality, the end manufacturer risks a product recall. The manufacturer can offer a contract stipulating harsh penalties in this event. Mandatory insurance may be required if the supplier cannot be compelled to pay the penalty.

Keywords: supply chain efficiency; quality; moral hazard; mandatory insurance; product recalls (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L14 L15 L25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ijbe.fcu.edu.tw/assets/ijbe/past_issue/No.11-1/pdf/vol_11-1-1.pdf (application/pdf)
https://ijbe.fcu.edu.tw/assets/ijbe/past_issue/No.11-1/abstract/01.html (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ijb:journl:v:11:y:2012:i:1:p:1-11

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Business and Economics is currently edited by Hsiang-Tsai Chiang (Editor-in-Chief), Chiung-Ju Huang (Editor-in-Chief), Feng-Jyh Lin (Associate Editor), Tzu-Ching Weng (Associate Editor), Hsin-Yi Huang (Managing Editor) and Szu-Hsien Ho (Managing Editor)

More articles in International Journal of Business and Economics from School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Szu-Hsien Ho ().