Evaluate the Effectiveness of Manager Compensation

Cheng-Feng Cheng

International Journal of Business and Economics, 2012, vol. 11, issue 1, 25-44

Abstract: This study develops a conceptual model for compensation from firm and manager perspectives. We identify the negotiating range for a compensation plan and adopt a dynamic bargaining game to optimize the equilibrium of base salary and bonus.

Keywords: game theory; optimization; compensation; negotiation; risk analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 J33 M12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ijb:journl:v:11:y:2012:i:1:p:25-44

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