Cournot Competition in a Multiproduct Duopoly: Specialization through Licensing

Luigi Filippini

International Journal of Business and Economics, 2006, vol. 5, issue 3, 201-210

Abstract: In a duopoly where both firms produce substitutes, we show that under process innovation, specialization is the equilibrium attained with cross-licensing. Each firm produces only the good for which it has an advantage, and social welfare may improve. Patent pool extension confirms the results.

Keywords: cross-licensing; patent pool; specialization; process innovation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D45 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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