Cournot Competition in a Multiproduct Duopoly: Specialization through Licensing
Luigi Filippini ()
International Journal of Business and Economics, 2006, vol. 5, issue 3, 201-210
In a duopoly where both firms produce substitutes, we show that under process innovation, specialization is the equilibrium attained with cross-licensing. Each firm produces only the good for which it has an advantage, and social welfare may improve. Patent pool extension confirms the results.
Keywords: cross-licensing; patent pool; specialization; process innovation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D45 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ijb:journl:v:5:y:2006:i:3:p:201-210
Access Statistics for this article
International Journal of Business and Economics is currently edited by Kun-Huang Huarng (Editor-in-Chief), Domingo Ribeiro Soriano (Associate Editor), Feng-Jyh Lin (Associate Editor) and Fang-Yi Lo (Managing Editor)
More articles in International Journal of Business and Economics from School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chia-Hung Wang ().