Financial Predation by the "Weak"

Spiros Bougheas and Saksit Thananittayaudom
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Saksit Thananittayaudom: Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand

International Journal of Business and Economics, 2006, vol. 5, issue 3, 231-244

Abstract: We consider a Stackelberg game, where a financially constrained leader competes with a "deep pocket" follower, and analyze the trade-off between a financial and a strategic advantage for both the design of financial contracts and market structure.

Keywords: predation; financial contracts; Stackelberg game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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