Endogenous Exposure to Systemic Liquidity Risk

Jin Cao (jin.cao@norges-bank.no) and Gerhard Illing
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Gerhard Illing: Department of Economics, University of Munich and CESifo

International Journal of Central Banking, 2011, vol. 7, issue 2, 173-216

Abstract: Traditionally, aggregate liquidity shocks are modeled as exogenous events. This paper analyzes the adequate policy response to endogenous exposure to systemic liquidity risk. We analyze the feedback between lender-of-last-resort policy and incentives of private banks, determining the aggregate amount of liquidity available. We show that imposing minimum liquidity standards for banks ex ante is a crucial requirement for sensible lender-of-last-resort policy. In addition, we analyze the impact of equity requirements and narrow banking, in the sense that banks are required to hold sufficient liquid funds so as to pay out in all contingencies. We show that both policies are strictly inferior to imposing minimum liquidity standards ex ante combined with lender-of-last-resort policy.

JEL-codes: E5 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Endogenous exposure to systemic liquidity risk (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2011:q:2:a:6

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